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SYMPOSIA SUMMARY
Consuming Uncertainty: Feelings, Expectations, and Wishful Thinking in Consumer Choice
and Experience
Eduardo B. Andrade, University of California, Berkeley, USA
SESSION OVERVIEW
Managers and consumers usually think of uncertainty as a
negative—to-be-avoided—aspect of a given purchasing or con-
sumption experience. The four papers presented in this symposium
challenge this intuition. Andrade and Iyer show that in a scenario
where they must “pre-commit” to a sequence of 2 gambles, con-
sumers choose to lower their bets after anticipated losses (vs. gains).
When losses are eventually experienced, they bet more than they
had initially planned. Dynamic inconsistencies are not observed
after gains. The authors discuss potential underlying processes and
the role of feelings. Nelson, Galak, and Vosgerau investigate the
potential (mis)matching between forecasting and experiencing
excitement. In prospect, people seem to put a substantial premium
on the excitement of outcome uncertainty in televised sporting
event,, but it remains unclear if this actually improves the experi-
ence. The authors show that in many cases, uncertainty operates
much different than consumers predict. Although people enjoy a
live game more than a taped game, the benefit is eliminated if people
also place a bet in the game. Moreover, people enjoy the uncertainty
that comes with wagering on games, despite the added anxiety it
brings. Furthermore, though people believe that knowing the out-
come in advance will ruin the experience, it actually has no negative
effect, and knowing the game play ahead of time actually improves
the experience of watching the game.
Mazar and Ariely expand the relationship between uncertainty
and excitement by investigating probabilistic discounts. When will
a probabilistic discount (i.e., gambling-type) be preferred over a
fixed discount? Why would it be preferred? The authors show that
probabilistic discounts are more appealing than fixed discounts of
the same expected value. Moreover, this preference results from a
desire to “avoid the pain of paying” rather than to “enjoy the
excitement of the gambling”. Finally, Goldsmith & Amir also show
that there are motivational advantages to uncertain cues. They find
that promotions offering uncertain rewards are more persuasive
than those which offer certain rewards with a higher expected value.
For example, lotteries between smaller and larger rewards can be as
attractive as larger certain rewards. Consumers tend to show intui-
tive wishful thinking, a tendency that may be mitigated through
elaboration and a-priori attitudes.
In short, consumers occasionally seek uncertainty, even when
it seems strictly suboptimal. Although they may derive direct utility
from it (Goldsmith, Amir; Mazar & Ariely) they might also over-
estimate its benefits (Nelson, Galak, & Vosgerau). On other occa-
sions consumers will to endure its costs (Andrade and Iyer) in
pursuit of a distal benefit. Regardless, whether in the context of
gambling, product promotions, or televised sports, it seems clear
that consumers will frequently incorporate the anticipated levels of
uncertainty into their decision making process.
We are pleased to have Tom Meyvis as our discussant, whose
expertise across the entire field should help to integrate the four
papers and place them in the context of the ongoing theory,
research, and practice of consumer research.
EXTENDED ABSTRACTS
“Dynamic Inconsistencies in Gambling: The Role of
Feelings”
Eduardo B. Andrade, University of California, Berkeley
Ganesh Iyer, University of California, Berkeley
Anecdotal evidence suggests that in a gambling environment
people might violate pre-commitments, and bet more than they had
initially planned. In this paper, we investigate this phenomenon in
a scenario where (i) participants have full information about the
characteristics of the gamble prior to a planning phase (ii) the time
period between the planning and actual phases of the gambles is
very short (around 1 minute), (iii) and participants are reminded of
the planned bet right before the actual bet. The research paradigm
follows a two-stage process. First, during the “pre-commitment”
phase, participants are asked to pre-commit to a series of 2 fair
gambles. In gamble 2 they are given the opportunity to bet contin-
gent on winning/losing the previous bet. Then, during the actual
phase of the gambles participants are unexpectedly allowed to
confirm or revise the “pre-committed” bets. In other to increase
external validity, participants are authorized to use their own
participation fee in the experiments and bet any amount within a
pre-determined budget (i.e., $0 to $5 per gamble).
The results throughout all three experiments show that, on
average, participants plan to bet less after an anticipated loss and the
same amount after an anticipated gain. Also, asymmetric dynamic
inconsistencies emerge during the actual phase of the gamble, as
participants bet on average more than initially planned after expe-
riencing a loss and the same amount after experiencing a gain.
Experiments 2 and 3 address the mechanisms leading to the
systematic deviation after losses. Following the hot-cold empathy
gap, we hypothesize that people underestimate their negative feel-
ings and its impact on subsequent behavior. It has been shown that
people eat more, shop more, take more drugs, and report riskier
sexual behaviors than they had initially planned in a cold state.
Whether deprived from food, information, drugs, sex, or money
individuals will react, and usually exaggerate, in an attempt to
reestablish the prior state. Translated into gambling contexts, it
means that during the pre-commitment phase (cold state) partici-
pants underestimate the impact of the feelings during actual phase
(hot state). Precisely, negative emotions generated by losses lead
people to “over bet” (i.e., positively deviate from the initial plan) in
a visceral attempt to restore a current affective state in the prospect
of winning.
In experiment 2, therefore, an affective correction manipula-
tion is used, where a subset of participants is asked to avoid using
their post-outcome feelings generated in gamble 1 during the
subsequent bet. Consistent with the hot-cold empathy gap, the
asymmetric dynamic inconsistencies disappear when people are
requested to correct for the potential impact of post-outcome
feelings of gamble 1 on bet decisions in gamble 2.
In experiment 3, we assess whether participants underestimate
their negative feelings after a loss. Following the pre-commitment
phase but before the actual phase, participants are asked to forecast
their feelings after a potential gain and after potential loss in gamble
1. Once the outcome 1 is realized participants are asked to report
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current feelings. The results show that participants on average
underestimate how bad they will feel after a loss in gamble 1 and are
on average accurate about their positive feelings after a gain.
Moreover, most participants who deviate from the plan after a loss
are also the ones more likely to underestimate their negative
feelings after the loss is experienced. No such contingency is
observed after a gain.
“The Unexpected Enjoyment of Expected Events: The
Suboptimal Consumption of Televised Sports”
Leif Nelson, University of California, San Diego
Jeff Galak, New York University
Joachim Vosgerau, Carnegie Mellon University
Sometimes uncertain events are more exciting than their
certain alternatives. Consistent with this excitement-seeking drive,
when watching sporting events people put a substantial premium on
the feeling of uncertainty by experiencing them live (as opposed to
taped) or by placing wagers on the outcomes (Vosgerau,
Wertenbroch, & Carmon, 2006). Does all this extra uncertainty and
anxiety actually improve the experience? Recent work suggests
that it might not, instead suggesting that the added uncertainty may
come at a cost to the enjoyment of the experience (Mandel and
Nowlis, 2007). Four studies investigate the influence of prediction
and outcome knowledge on the experience of watching sports
programming. We derive two types of uncertainty, process and
outcome, in order to manipulate and identify which factors make
televised sports most enjoyable to watch. Inclusive in this analysis
is a consideration of sports betting, which had been previously
shown to have a negative influence on enjoyment, but which in
these studies we show can have a highly variable influence.
In our first study, American participants watched the final few
minutes of closely contested women’s European handball match.
Some participants were told that the game was being streamed live
from Germany, whereas the remainder were told that it was a
previously taped game. Additionally, approximately half of the
participants in each group were given an opportunity to predict the
winner of the game (after reading some basic information about the
teams). All participants then watched the game and indicated how
much they enjoyed it. As people have forecasted in previous
research (Vosgerau, Wertenbroch, & Carmon, 2006) participants
enjoyed the game more when it was ‘live.’ However, this difference
only held for people who did not bet on the game; the difference was
eliminated for people who had an additional stake in the outcome.
Though some uncertainty improves the consumption of televised
sports, when coupled with the arousal of a bet on the outcome,
uncertainty has no additional impact.
Study 2 compared three different viewing conditions (this
time of the overtime period of a professional basketball game): A
control condition, a betting condition, and a condition in which the
participants knew the final score beforehand. All of these
Experiencers watched the entire 15-minute clip and reported their
enjoyment. We were particularly interested to know if people were
well calibrated to the influences of these factors, so we asked
Forecasters to read a description of the each condition the
Experiencers faced and to predict their enjoyment. Forecasters
accurately predicted that people would enjoy the game more when
they bet on the outcome, but they incorrectly predicted that people
would enjoy the game less when they knew the outcome. Forecast-
ers universally thought that eliminating outcome uncertainty would
ruin the viewing experience, but it had no impact whatsoever.
But is all uncertainty the same? When people think of uncer-
tainty in sports they instantly think of the outcome, but fail to
consider the uncertainties of each event leading up to the game
outcome. It may be the case that, in fact, the cumulative impact of
those smaller uncertainties may outweigh the outcome uncertainty
when determining the overall enjoyment. When this process uncer-
tainty is reduced or eliminated, the anxiety associated with it is also
removed leaving people to experience only the excitement associ-
ate with the experience. Study 3 sought to show that process
uncertainty, rather than outcome uncertain was the driver of enjoy-
ment. When watching the same overtime period as in Study 2, half
of the participants were told which team would win the game
(outcome certain) and half were not (outcome uncertain). Further-
more, for about half the participants the audio channel was offset so
that the announcers reported on the game play 3 seconds ahead of
time (process certain) versus 3 seconds delayed (process uncertain).
In accordance with our hypotheses, Forecasters thought that they
would enjoy watching the game less when either outcome or
process was certain. But, in fact, Experiencers enjoyed watching
the game equally whether the outcome was certain or not. Viewers
enjoyed the game more when the process was certain than when it
was uncertain. So, while viewers think uncertainty generally en-
hances enjoyment, process uncertainty actually dampens it.
Is it always the case that process uncertainty is aversive? Study
4 addressed this question by having participants watch the same
overtime period as in Studies 2 and 3. Approximately half of the
participants bet on the outcome of the game and the other half did
not. Additionally, we again manipulated process uncertainty by
offsetting the audio channel either 3 seconds ahead of time (process
certain) or 3 seconds delayed (process uncertain). We reasoned that
bettors were actually deriving hedonic value from the feeling of
anxiety, and so their enjoyment should go down with increased
certainty. For non-bettors we replicated our finding from study 3:
process uncertainty is aversive. However, for bettors, process
certainty was aversive. Furthermore, by collecting continuous
measures of excitement throughout the entire viewing experience
we were able to determine that this variability was only present in
the second half of the experience, when the outcome was looming.
Though betting on sports can make them more enjoyable, that
enjoyment is predicated on the uncertainty of the entire event.
“Probabilistic Discounts: When Retailing and Las Vegas
Meet”
Nina Mazar, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dan Ariely, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
People love to gamble. Recent numbers provided by
Christiansen Capital Advisors CCA and the American Gaming
Assocation (http://www.americangaming.org) support the notion
of gambling as a mammoth phenomenon in our society: Consumer
spending on traditional gambling including commercial casinos,
racetracks, card rooms, and lotteries generated a $85 billion input
to the U.S. economy in 2005 and Internet gambling has been
estimated to reach $25 billion in global revenues by 2010. Given
these observations we were wondering whether we can design a
new type of discount that combines retailing with gambling such
that it becomes more attractive for both consumers and retailers.
Imagine that you are at the checkout of your local video store
and they offer you one of two discounts: What would you choose?
A fixed discount that offers a guaranteed 10% off your
purchase OR
A probabilistic discount that offers a 10% chance to get your
purchase for free and 90% chance to pay the full price
Choices among gambles have been the “fruit fly” of research
on decision-making. In the current work we examine gambles in
context of purchases and in particular in context of discounts. There
are several reasons why a probabilistic discount is likely to work.
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First, there is the attraction of the gamble itself, due to excitement,
curiosity, wishful thinking, or variable schedules of reinforcement.
Second, getting something for free (i.e. zero price) seems to not only
reduce cost, but also add benefit such that people are disproportionally
attracted to free items (Shampan’er and Ariely, forthcoming).
Finally, recent evidence suggests that paying–part of the buying
transaction–is psychologically painful and people therefore try to
avoid paying (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998).
The questions we examine are: 1) Under what conditions do
consumers prefer risky / probabilistic discounts? 2) Under what
conditions would consumers spend more money if they were given
probabilistic discounts? 3) What is the cause for the attraction of the
probabilistic-discount? 4) Finally, we use this type of data to
examine whether consumers think of purchasing more as a gain or
as a loss in terms of their risk attitude.
We examine these questions in four experiments. First, in a
field experiment we offer customers of a local video store at
checkout a choice between a fixed discount and a probabilistic
discount on one video rental with equal expected value. We exam-
ine the preference between these two discounts at a 10%, 33%, 50%,
67%, and 90% chance of getting one rental for free and find that in
general customers significantly prefer the probabilistic discount
over the fixed discount.
Next, we designed an online store in which students were able
to spend their own money and buy items ranging from $0.50
(candy) to $15 (Amazon Gift Certificate). We had three different
versions of the store manipulated between subjects, offering a 10%
fixed discount, a 10% probabilistic discount, and a choice between
these two types of discounts. Our results show that customers in the
probabilistic discount store purchased significantly more of the
cheaper items but significantly less of the expensive items. Custom-
ers shopping in the store that offered both types of discounts showed
a pattern of behavior that was somewhere in the middle although
they showed a strong preference for the probabilistic discount.
In a third experiment, we repeated the first experiment in the
local video store but this time varying the probabilistic discount
such that it would not always offer a chance to get the item for free
but instead to buy it for a small, insignificant amount (probabilistic
discounts: 11% chance to pay $0, 12% chance to pay $0.38, 13%
chance to pay $0.69), while keeping the expected value the same.
Again we find that in general customers significantly prefer the
probabilistic discount over the fixed discount and that it does not
matter whether the probabilistic discount involved a chance of
getting the item for free or for a small $ amount. This result suggests
that the attraction of the probabilistic discount is not due to the
special role of a zero price.
Finally, we contrast consumers’ preference for risky options
over sure options in context of purchases for a designer pen with
purchases of gift certificates for Amazon.com (a product that comes
relatively close to money) and with their preferences in context of
gambles involving money-prizes of equal expected surplus. Our
results suggest that the attraction for risky options is higher for
product purchases than for gift certificate purchases, and even
higher than for monetary gambles. Together these findings suggest
that the probabilistic discount is significantly driven by the pain of
paying involved in a purchase and not (only) by the gamble and the
excitement of winning something.
By bringing probabilities to the marketplace we are able to
examine how consumers react to probabilities in settings that they
are more used to, and hopefully expand our understanding of
decision-making under risk more generally.
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“Wishful Thinking: How Uncertainty Can Improve
Promotions”
Kelly Goldsmith, Yale University
On Amir, University of California, San Diego
Advertisements for consumer incentives often contain vary-
ing degrees of certainty as to the nature of the incentive. For
example, one advertisement might promise a generous gift with
purchase. Another might offer a gift with purchase which could be
either a generous gift or a more modest gift (the latter incentive
being comparably more uncertain). As wishful thinking is only free
to operate when the value of an incentive is not explicitly delin-
eated, it seems possible that appraisals of an uncertain incentive’s
value could be boosted by wishful thinking and might even exceed
those aroused by a more specific incentive.
Most conceptualizations of consumer behavior suggest that
people tend to be risk averse over gains, that is, they prefer a sure
good to a lottery of equivalent expected gain. In particular, because
receiving a free gift in a promotion is a gain for consumers, Prospect
Theory argues that consumers should be risk averse and favor the
more “certain” outcome (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). However,
research has also shown that uncertainty can allow consumers to
wishfully think that a superior outcome will emerge and use that as
an “elastic justification” (Hsee, 1995). Thus the results on uncer-
tainty are mixed and the question of when wishful thinking aroused
by greater uncertainty can boost the perceived value of an incentive
above its expected value remains unresolved.
The key hypothesis of this paper is that such instances exist.
We claim that uncertain incentives can be appealing when our
natural wishful thinking is allowed to operate. This premise relies
on the following assumptions about judgments in the domain of
gains: 1) People intuitively demonstrate wishful thinking; 2) This
wishful thinking holistically increases the perceived value of uncer-
tain rewards; 3) When the judgment is not intuitive, or when factors
that inhibit wishful thinking exist, this effect will not occur. We test
the theoretical and empirical foundations for these premises in a
series of experiments by altering the degree of certainty in the
incentives which consumers are shown and assessing consumers’
judgments of those incentives.
Our pilot study demonstrates that uncertain promotions can be
more motivating than their expected value, and consequently may
be as motivating as certain high value rewards. In one condition we
offer either a high value reward (a free iTunes song download) and
in another condition a low value reward (a point towards a future
prize). In a third condition we offer the lottery between the above-
mentioned rewards. In line with our predictions, our results show
that the lottery between the high and low value rewards is just as
effective at generating interest as the high value reward.
Experiments 1-5 explore the process behind this effect. The
results of these studies demonstrate that our intuitive wishful
thinking is what colors an uncertain incentive with a rosy glow.
Thus when we are told that the incentive is a lottery between a high
value and a low value reward, our automatic, intuitive response is
to perceive the value of this uncertain offer as being greater than its
expected value.
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We find that this intuitive wishful thinking is different from
generalized optimism and is not driven by a biased understanding
of base rates. Experiments 1 and 2 illustrate the intuitive nature of
these assessments: when any elaboration is encouraged before
judgments are made, the positive effect of uncertainty is signifi-
cantly diminished. Calling into question one’s likelihood of receiv-
ing the high value incentive (Experiment 1), or simply encouraging
participants to “think carefully” before responding (Experiment 2)
negates the operation of automatic wishful thinking. In both in-
stances, interest in the uncertain incentive dropped significantly
and was on par with interest in the low value reward, as opposed to
the high value reward. Interestingly, ratings of one’s likelihood of
receiving the high value incentive made ex-post were statistically
indistinguishable from those made ex-ante, supporting the claim
that this effect is not driven by a biased understanding of base rates.
While we demonstrate that when allowed to operate wishful
thinking can increase the perceived value of an uncertain gain above
its expected value, one may question if the participants evaluating
the lottery incentive are actually engaging in wishful thinking or if
they are simply focusing their attention on the more extreme of the
two outcomes. Experiment 3 rules out this alternate account by
assessing consumers’ interest in receiving a flu shot when the side
effect is either negative (extreme option), moderately negative
(preferred option), or a lottery between the two. In line with our
contention that consumers employ innate wishful thinking, interest
in this lottery condition does not resemble interest in the extreme
alternative, but rather resembles that of the preferred alternative
with interest in each being higher than that of interest in the extreme
option.
Experiments 4 and 5 manipulated antecedents of optimism to
further explore what drives interest in uncertain offers. The results
demonstrate that when affect is manipulated, uncertain incentives
can be as motivating as high value incentives offered with certainty
when a positive mood is induced (Experiment 4). As prior research
has demonstrated the correlation between mood and optimism
(Marshall et al, 1992), these results illustrate how heightening
wishful thinking can increase the positive impact of uncertainty on
a promotion’s effectiveness, while dampening it has deleterious
consequences for interest in uncertain incentives. Experiment 5
replicates these findings using a-priori trust in the retailer to
manipulate wishful thinking. Again, when wishful thinking is
allowed to operate it increased the effectiveness of the uncertain
promotion beyond its rational value. These results illustrate a
boundary condition which should read as cautionary to some
retailers: uncertainty might not be positive when the nature of the
retailer promotes skepticism; on the other hand, trusted brands and
established venues may benefit by adding uncertainty to their
promotions.
Our results contribute to a growing body of literature on how
and when uncertainty can be motivating. We believe the research
enriches our understanding of how consumers react to retailer
promotions and has clear practical implications for marketers.
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